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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines Vietnam’s efforts during the past two and a
half decades to build up its legal infrastructure during its transition from a
centrally planned to a market economy. In particular, this Article will
focus on the development of legal and regulatory infrastructure to support
the development of the corporate sector and fiduciary culture in Vietnam.
In thinking about corporate law, I do not intend to single out this particular
area of law as somehow special in the context of transition. In fact, its
commonness and generality are what makes the experience of the
development of corporate law and corporate culture so useful in thinking
about the rule of law, law and development, and the role of culture in the
development of legal systems. This Article is written with some degree of
humility; the source of this humility is a recognition that the legal and
regulatory infrastructure at the center of the new rule of law movement is
not an unbending prerequisite for successful development of the corporate
sector, and that development of fiduciary culture requires more than law
in books.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and Soviet-styled central
planning beginning in the late 1980s, transition countries like Vietnam
faced immediate and critical challenges to transition to new marketoriented models of organization.1 Currently, this transition from central
planning to markets is a decades-long project that remains incomplete.
Central to all these transition efforts has been a near-wholesale reworking
of the legal structures undergirding economic and social relationships.

* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author was the Vietnam Country
Coordinator for Harvard University’s Institute for International Development in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam from 1994 to 2000. As country coordinator, the author was responsible for all of Harvard
University’s Vietnam-based teaching, research, and advising activities.
1. See Michael Haynes, Eastern European Transition: Some Practical and Theoretical
Problems, 31 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 467, 467, 472–73, 478 (1996). See generally JÁNOS KORNAI,
THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNISM 383–395 (1992).
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There is little doubt that the adoption of new legal rules governing
business entities was an essential component in spurring the growth of the
private sector in Vietnam. However, the shift from a restrictive regulatory
environment to a more open, enabling one was, in part, hoped to create a
fiduciary culture amongst managers and shareholders. A fiduciary culture
is one in which typical fiduciary norms of care and loyalty are respected
and enforced by shareholders. However, now almost two decades later,
transition of the corporate sector to a fiduciary culture remains a work in
progress. Although formal legal structures to support the creation of a
market-oriented private sector are now in place, such structures remain
insufficient for norm creation, and the development of a robust fiduciary
culture remains far afield.
A principal source of deficiencies in corporate governance in
Vietnam lies with still nascent acceptance of fiduciary norms as a vital
component of the corporate law. Rather than rely on a bottom-up
development of fiduciary norms by way of shareholder enforcement, there
is evidence that regulators remain committed to a public enforcement
approach to corporate governance.2 Old habits die hard, as they say.
Whether a top-down public enforcement approach to norm creation will
be more efficacious than developing a shareholder-centric fiduciary
culture remains an open question. Nevertheless, there are a number of
other informal transmission vectors present in Vietnam, beyond the courts
and formal legal structures, which make the development of a
self-enforcing fiduciary culture possible, though not guaranteed.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I of this Article
places the development of Vietnam’s new corporate governance structures
in the context of the larger law and development movements since the late
1960s. Part II of this Article describes the new rule of law movement and
the role of corporate law in that project. In Part III, this Article describes
formal governance structures adopted as part of corporate law reform and
identifies weaknesses in the development of fiduciary norms as a
continuing weakness of Vietnam’s corporate governance structures. Part
IV evaluates informal transmission vectors, like trade agreements and
foreign investment, that might support the development of fiduciary
culture.
I. THE LAW AND DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENTS
During the 1960s, many international aid agencies undertook efforts
to engage in the development of legal systems to accompany their
economic development activities. These law-oriented projects were
2. See infra Part III.
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undergirded by concepts of “legal liberalism.”3 In its broadest sense, legal
liberalism has a number of components. First, the state is the central
organizing authority for societies. Second, the state acts through law.
Third, laws are designed to achieve some socially valuable purpose
through some sort of representative process. Fourth, these laws are applied
equally for the purposes they were designed for. Fifth, courts are the
central institution for the implementation of legal order; and finally, that
society tends to conform to rules.4
Key to understanding the focus of attention of the law and
development movement on formal legal institutions is the concept of legal
liberalism and the power and centrality of the state, a centrality that was
often as much assumed as it was reflective of reality. This view of law in
the 1960s saw law and legal institutions as tools to be deployed to facilitate
economic development and the development of civil society.5 Ultimately,
these highly formalistic, U.S.-centric approaches were met with a high
degree of skepticism.6 Few, if any, of the assumptions of legal liberalism
survived arrival in the post-colonial, developing world. The developing
world had little appetite to import U.S. legal institutions.7
Since the collapse of the law and development movements in the
1960s, two major milestones fueled a resurgence of interest in the question
of law and its relationship to economic development. The first of these was
the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc and economic reform in Asian
Socialist economies starting in the late 1980s. The second motivation was
the development of a global trading regime under the rubric of the World
Trade Organization during the 1990s.8

3. Marc Galanter & David M. Trubek, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1063 (1974)
(“Legal development assistance was originally justified as a rational and effective method to protect
individual freedom, expand citizen participation in decisionmaking, enhance social equality, and
increase the capacity of all citizens rationally to control events and shape social life.”); see Brian Z.
Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law & Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 473 (1995) (describing
the perpetual crisis afflicting law and development studies). See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL
IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (arguing that
foreign aid to the legal sector was thrust upon developing countries in the mistaken belief that
American legal institutions would facilitate the rapid economic development as well as development
of civil societies).
4. Galanter & Trubek, supra note 3, at 1070–72.
5. Id. at 1074.
6. See id.; GARDNER, supra note 3, at 9–11, 35–37; David M. Trubek, Law and Development:
40 Years after Scholars in Self-Estrangement, U. TORONTO L.J., May 2016, at 1, 22.
7. GARDNER, supra note 3, at 34.
8. See Binh Tran-Nam, VIETNAM: Preparations for WTO Membership, 2007 SOUTHEAST
ASIAN AFF. 398, 399–402 (2007) (describing some of the legal reforms required for accession to WTO
membership).
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A new law and development movement arose in the wake of the
beginning of the transition experience across Eastern Europe and Asia,
notwithstanding resistance to its American-centric predecessor under the
rubric of the “rule of law.”9 The transition from central planning to marketoriented economies highlighted the importance of legal systems.
Functioning markets require rules. Sometimes market rules are
spontaneously developed, but mostly they are not.10 Because the
regulatory structures of Soviet-styled systems were wholly inappropriate
for the market, a legal and regulatory vacuum accompanied every
transition from planning to market. The regulatory and legal structures of
the ancien regime were either going to be ignored or were going to be
revamped to become more supportive of market activity.11
Soviet-styled legal regimes focused heavily on questions of criminal
and family law to the exclusion of civil law.12 This is, of course, is entirely
understandable. In a Soviet-styled central plan, there were no civil,
commercial relationships; rather, the central plan dictated all economic
production.13 To the extent there were disputes amongst economic units,
with respect to production and fulfillment of the plan (e.g., how much of
which type of product produced at what time), such disputes were resolved
through bureaucratic processes and not the courts.14
When central planning melted away, there was an obvious void.
Courts and the legal system, more used to prosecuting the guilty with
criminal sanctions, were out of their depth and without much by way of
guidance for navigating the new world of civil, commercial disputes. They
would need a wholly new regulatory structure to quickly fill the void left
9. See Carol V. Rose, The “New” Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era:
A Vietnam Case Study, 32 L. & SOC. REV. 93, 93–94 (1998). Among others, see generally THOMAS
CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999); KATHARINA PISTOR,
PHILIP A. WELLONS & JEFFREY SACHS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1960–1995 (1999); THE RULE OF LAW REVIVAL IN PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006); Jacques deLisle,
Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the
Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179 (1999).
10. See, e.g., Brian JM Quinn & Anh T.T. Vu, Farmers, Middlemen, and the New Rule of Law
Movement, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J., 273, 325 (2010) (highlighting the development of informal
market rules in the absence of formal regulation).
11. See Trubek, supra note 6, at 10; THE WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S:
LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM 279 (2005), http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/lessons
1990s/chaps/frontmatter.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRY6-UBFK]. See generally John Gillespie,
Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and Cultural Analysis of Market-Entry in Vietnam, 51
INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 641 (2002).
12. See Brian JM Quinn, Legal Reform and Its Context in Vietnam, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 219,
222 (2002) (describing the nature of the formal legal structures in Vietnam).
13. See KORNAI, supra note 1, at 97–103, 121–24 (discussing bureaucratic and market
coordination in socialist systems).
14. See id.
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by the collapse of economic planning institutions. Carothers calls this
focus on the laws “type 1 reforms” and the focus on strengthening legal
institutions, like courts, “type 2 reforms.”15 Of course, the new rule of law
movement expanded well beyond the primary focus of rebuilding the
regulatory infrastructure to support the development of markets (type 1
and type 2 reforms) as the countries of the former-Soviet Republics and
Eastern Europe moved to develop new political systems. The new rule of
law movement reached back to many of the same themes of democracy
promotion hailed by the original law and development movement.16
Nevertheless, in Asian transition economies like Vietnam, where
reform efforts were more gradual, the focus of rule of law efforts remained
on dismantling and then rebuilding the outdated regulatory structure to
support markets. Left largely untouched in Vietnam are what Carothers
calls “type 3” reforms.17 Type 3 reforms have deeper goals, including the
development of a culture of compliance with the law by citizens as well as
the government itself.18 Included under the larger umbrella of type 3
reforms is the development of fiduciary culture in the corporate sector.
The new rule of law movement started, in part, from the assumption
that strong legal rights are fundamental to a functioning market
economy.19 The theoretical basis for the movement is attractive. Where
legal rights are strong (e.g., property and contract rights are protected),
parties can engage in anonymous market transactions safe in the
knowledge that private contractual promises are backed by a reasonably
efficient public enforcement regime. Strong public enforcement
institutions can provide a backdrop against which parties feel confident in
engaging in transactions with strangers, often with many terms still left
undefined.20 Consequently, a system of strong legal rights working in the
15. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 99–100.
16. See CAROTHERS, supra note 9, at 41; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 279; Carothers,
supra note 15, at 99–100.
17. Carothers, supra note 15, at 99.
18. Id.
19. Hernando de Soto is an eloquent proponent of the view that strong formal property rights are
necessary for economic growth. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 18–28 (2003).
De Soto, however, is not the only proponent of the importance of formal property rights. Among many
others, see generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON.
HIST. 16 (1973). See also Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinen, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West,
Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries, 18 WORLD BANK
RES. OBSERVER 89, 89–91 (2003); deLisle, supra note 9, at 180–82.
20. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (studying informal contracting practices amongst businesses in the
U.S.); see also Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement
in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1549 (2006) (noting that the vast majority of litigated
civil cases in developed countries result in settlement before adjudication in the shadow of the formal
law).
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background can generate high levels of “generalized trusts,” even among
strangers, and translates into a greater willingness of economic actors to
make long-term investments and engage in complex transactions, thus
facilitating economic development.21
In the context of post-Soviet transition economies, the new rule of
law movement found a home, beginning in the 1990s.22 Formal legal
structures designed to support central planning systems found themselves
hopelessly antiquated following the shift to markets. Formal structures and
institutions were simply unable to manage, and generalized trust suffered.
Consequently, economic transition provided an urgent impetus to rule of
law activities that were missing during the height of the law and
development movement. Such activities included a host of top-down
efforts to rewrite legislation as well as efforts to reorient and train the
judiciary, not unlike many of the efforts of the law and development
movement of the past.23 The challenge, especially in Vietnam, remains
moving from type 1 and type 2 reforms to type 3 reforms (i.e., developing
fiduciary culture). Developing things like fiduciary culture takes much
more time, and thus, remains a work in progress.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW PROJECT
One of the first issues on the transition agenda was the reformation
of economic relations and recognition of a role for the private sector;
specifically, for the private corporate sector.24 Certainly, there are many
issues on the transition agenda, but for the former Soviet satellites in crisis
and Asian socialist countries embarking on a reform agenda, the company
law—for a time—took its place at the very front of the line. The 1990s
were heady days for U.S. corporate governance.25 Having shown its
predominance over the less than optimal socialist model for economic
organization, it was no surprise that legal and development specialists
sought to export this model to economies desperate to restructure.
21. Steven N. Durlauf & Marcel Fafchamps, Social Capital, in 1B HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH 1646 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005) (defining “generalized trust”).
22. CAROTHERS, supra note 9, at 40–42 (describing the rising importance of rule of law programs
in the aftermath of the collapse of centrally-planned markets in Eastern Europe).
23. See generally THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM (2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3817166-1185895645304
/4044168-1186409169154/18initiativesFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/N48L-2ERU] (cataloging various
Vietnam based legal reform efforts).
24. Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern
Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 102, 104–05 (1995).
25. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 439 (2001) (arguing that corporate law had reached a high degree of uniformity across
jurisdictions). This view was not, however, universal. See JOHN S. GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING
COMMERCIAL LAW IN VIETNAM 4–6 (2006).
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Although the early 1990s appeared to be the end of history for
corporate law, it was more of a modest pause in its development. The
corporate law, like all law, is not static, but it is constantly evolving in
response to changing environments. The framework motivating our
understanding of corporate governance can be traced to the important
work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. The impetus for Professors
Berle and Means when they wrote The Modern Corporation and Private
Property in 1932 was that the United States was itself in the midst of
transition in terms of the structure of corporate ownership.26 During the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the “era of finance capital,” most
publicly-traded U.S. businesses were controlled entities, with financiers,
entrepreneurs, and families controlling most of the country’s corporate
assets.27 Professors Berle and Means observed that by 1932, the corporate
ownership structure of most publicly-traded corporations was made up of
many shareholders with atomized holdings, the effect of which was that
no individual or group of shareholders could control the corporation.
Rather, their managers controlled the corporations. The structure of
ownership uncovered by Professors Berle and Means led them to conclude
that the central problem of the corporate law is understanding and then
mitigating the power attributable to managers that results from the
separation of ownership and control.28
However, at the time, there was a debate between the view offered
by Professors Berle and Means and others, principally Professor E.
Merrick Dodd, who espoused a more managerial view of the corporate
law.29 Professor Dodd argued that managers of the corporation held their
position in a kind of trust.30 As a result, their obligations were broad and
included all sorts of constituencies like workers and the community, in
addition to their stockholders.31 Ultimately, Dodd’s view held sway for
quite some time. It was not until the 1970s when Milton Friedman
published his article, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase

26. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 44 (1932).
27. See generally id.; Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: The Governance and Power
of Large U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 579, 582 (2004) (“The period in the U.S. between
the mid-1890s and about 1920 is often referred to as the ‘era of finance capital.’ Many of the great
trusts, combinations of large numbers of firms that were combined into huge corporations, were
formed in the 1895–1904 period.”).
28. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 26, at 123–25.
29. See generally Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 1145 (1931).
30. Id. at 1146.
31. Id. at 1152.
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Profits, that the idea of shareholder primacy began to take hold.32 During
the 1980s and 1990s, legal scholars seconded this view and developed the
vocabulary of agency costs that dealt with the problem of the separation
of ownership and control observed by Professors Berle and Means.33 By
the time the transition took hold in formerly centrally planned systems,
corporate law had reached its end: minimization of agency costs in firms
with the atomized shareholding structures identified by Professors Berle
and Means.
However, over the course of the twentieth and early into the twentyfirst century, the structure of corporate ownership did not remain the same.
Publicly traded corporations are no longer owned by stockholders with
atomized holdings.34 Rather, we have entered a new age of financial
capitalism. With the rise of institutional investors over the past two
decades, Berle and Mean’s separation of ownership and control is no
longer the default regime. Institutional holders with larger blocks are in a
better position to advocate for themselves vis-a-vis managers, and agency
problems are, if not mitigated, at least not of the same type identified by
Berle and Means and academic economists of the 1980s. Institutional
holders, due to the size of their holdings, have economic incentives to
police managers. It is no surprise that by any objective measure we are
now in a period where shareholders are able to assert their power over
managers in ways that a century ago might not have been conceivable.35
As it turns out, the corporate ownership structure identified by Berle
and Means may have been an outlier, rather than the rule.36 Even before
our current swing back toward controlling shareholders and institutional
blockholding, controllers and blockholding were, and continue to be, the

32. See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. This issue and the current debate on shareholder
primacy is well described by Professor Lynn Stout. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
33. Among others, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
34. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve
(Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 19-07, 2019).
35. See Leo E. Strine, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors: A Pragmatic Reaction to the
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 454–55 (2014).
36. Indeed, even Berle and Means observed that the model of atomized shareholding that they
observed was unexpected, a marked break from previous understandings of corporate shareholding,
which was largely dominated by blockholding. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 26, at 47–49 (1932)
(characterizing the wide dispersion of stock ownership as a “fundamental change in the character of
wealth”).
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norm around the world.37 The ubiquity of blockholding rather than
atomized stockholding structures raises a question about the ultimate
efficacy of the advice given by corporate governance experts to transition
economies in the 1990s to adopt governance regimes modeled on the
Berle–Means conception of separation of ownership and management.
Rule of law proponents may have been assuming the efficiency and
sustainability of U.S. corporate ownership structures while attempting to
replicate what is actually an outlier corporate governance structure. The
subsequent rise of controller dominated ownership structures in transition
economies suggests the real limits of the path selected by adherents to the
new rule of law project of the 1990s.38
III. DEVELOPMENT OF FORMAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
IN VIETNAM
Vietnam began its economic transition (Đổi Mới) from central
planning to market in earnest during the early 1990s. Early on in its reform
process, Vietnam embarked on an ambitious effort to remake its formal
legal structures from the top-down to support the development of the new
market economy. While this effort has been aggressive in many respects,
it has fallen short of a complete remake of Vietnam’s legal system and
institutions. One area where Vietnam has given a high degree of focus is
in the sphere of economic management. Early on, Vietnam’s technocratic
elite realized that a wholesale reworking of the regulatory structure
supporting enterprises was going to be critical to the long-term success or
failure of the reform effort.
The legislative framework for the corporate sector in Vietnam has
undergone revision multiple times since the early 1990s.39 While later
changes focused on increasing the variety and complexity of business
forms available, the earliest revisions during the beginning of the reform
process were perhaps most significant and more lasting. The most
fundamental change to the corporate law occurred with the design of the
initial revision. In the Enterprise Law of 1999, Vietnam shifted from a
37. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 472 (1999). It was obvious to some as early as 2011 that perhaps,
even in the U.S., the Berle–Means framework was no longer justifiable given the change in shareholder
demographics. See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1121, 1121–22 (2011).
38. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 3, 13–14 (2000) (suggesting concentration of control is more prevalent where corporate
governance is weak).
39. Bui Xuan Hai, Vietnamese Company Law: The Development and Corporate Governance
Issues, 18 BOND L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2006) (describing the various amendments and legal changes
governing business entities in Vietnam from 1990 to 2005).
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“prohibitive” to an “enabling” paradigm with attributes of selfenforcement by shareholders.40
A. Enabling Legislation
Early efforts at reform included the 1987 Foreign Investment Law,
recognizing a role for private foreign investment.41 In 1990, the
government promulgated the Private Enterprise and Companies Laws,
which recognized the private sector and permitted the creation of a private
corporate sector for the first time.42 During this period, government
authorities attempted to maintain strict control over the operation of
businesses by leaning heavily on the familiar, but outdated, doctrine of
ultra vires.43 During this period, government authorities took aggressive
positions to attempt to control investment and business activities by both
the foreign and domestic private sector. Often, this application of power
was little more than arbitrary.44
The Enterprise Law of 1999 shifted the locus of decision-making and
power in the establishment of new companies from the government to
entrepreneurs. Under the previous petition system (xin-cho), the granting
of a corporate charter or authorization was discretionary with local
government authorities in a position to hold up applications for company
charters.45 There are at least two implications of the petition system. First,
to the extent formal or informal government policy opposed the
development of private enterprise generally or in specific sectors, the
withholding or the granting of required authorizations to do business was
a powerful level to direct or inhibit growth of commercial activity. Second,
the petition system also had a pernicious effect. By consolidating
discretionary power with a small number of authorities, the petition system

40. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1911, 1930–37 (1996) (describing prohibitive as well as self-enforcing models of corporate
law in post-Soviet transition).
41. Tang Thanh Trai Lê, The Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Vietnam, 1 INT’L TRADE
& BUS. L.J. 41, 50–51 (1995).
42. See Gillespie, supra note 11, at 646–48; see also Trai Lê, supra note 41, at 51–52; Katariina
Hakkala & Ari Kokko, The State and Private Sector in Vietnam 3 (Eur. Inst. of Japanese Stud.,
Working Paper No. 236, 2007) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
43. John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis, 30 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 325, 358–60 (1994).
44. See PHAM DUY NGHIA, VIETNAM BUSINESS LAW IN TRANSITION 56 (2002).
45. The observer will note the parallels between such a system and that which prevailed in the
U.S. during the nineteenth century. It was only after the turn of the twentieth century that U.S. states
began to adopt enabling statutes. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering,
1875–1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677, 681 (1989) (documenting New Jersey’s path from a system of
special incorporation charters to general enabling statutes).
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gave rise to opportunities and incentives for corruption.46 Not surprisingly,
although the private sector was formally recognized, the top-down
approach to managing development of the private sector inhibited its
growth.
The single most important change in the 1999 Enterprise Law was
the turning of the incorporation process on its head.47 By moving from a
petition system to one where incorporation becomes a statutory right, the
law, as written, had two immediate effects. First, it reduced the
discretionary authority of local officials to deny corporate registrations;
and thus, reduced opportunities and incentives for corruption.48 Second,
by removing obstacles to registration and incorporation and thus enabling
the private sector, the law unleashed commercial activity in the private
sector.49
The 1999 Enterprise Law marks another important step: the shifting
of regulation of corporate organization from public law to private law, at
least on paper. This was a significant shift because rather than relying on
government enforcement to regulate the internal organization of business
organizations, the 1999 Enterprise Law moves that burden to private
parties who have a greater incentive to order their own affairs as well as
to monitor the actions of managers. This shift also reflects a more
46. In reality, both of these implications are unremarkable. The granting and withholding of early
corporate charters were the primary vehicle of commercial and early industrial policy in Europe and
the United States. In the nineteenth century United States, where state legislatures were required to
pass individual acts of incorporation in order to create a corporate charter, state legislatures were
highly susceptible to corruption in large part due to rent seeking by legislators who could prevent the
issuance of special charters. See John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systematic Corruption in
American History, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN HISTORY 23, 49–51
(Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2004) [hereinafter Wallis, The Concept of Systemic
Corruption]; John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and
Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 211, 215 (2005); see also Camden Hutchison,
Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement,
3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1017, 1086–87 (2017) (noting that the federal incorporation movement would
reduce incentives for state legislators to engage in corrupt behavior).
47. See LUẬT DOANH NGHIỆP [LAW ON ENTERPRISES] [No. 13/1999/QH10] art. 9 (1999) (Viet.).
48. Prior to the adoption enabling statutes in the United States, each corporate charter offered
opportunities for corruption. During the “charter mongering” period, states, principally New Jersey,
liberalized their state corporate laws and routinized the process of incorporation, in part to reduce
incentives for corruption. Grandy, supra note 45, at 681. In that sense, the enabling structure was a
gift of the Progressive Movement and not explicitly intended to reduce the costs associated with the
separation of ownership and control. See Wallis, The Concept of Systemic Corruption, supra note 46,
at 49–51 (explaining that states solved the paradox of corruption and the promotion of economic
development by granting a corporate charter to anyone who wanted one, thereby reducing the incentive
for legislative corruption).
49. See DWIGHT H. PERKINS & VU THANH TU ANH, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH.: ASH INST. FOR
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION, VIETNAM’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY: DESIGNING
POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 25 (2008), https://ash.harvard.edu/files/vietnams
_industrial_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QPQ-6RMW].
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fundamental policy view that the internal organization of business affairs
is best accomplished through private ordering. The effect of this
restructuring is stark. During the first five years following the adoption of
the 1999 Enterprise Law, more than 136,400 formal private companies
were registered in Vietnam, and importantly, the pace of new formations
increased dramatically following the adoption of the 1999 Enterprise
Law.50 The pace of business formation has increased substantially since
the implementation of the Enterprise Law. In just the first months of 2019,
Vietnam’s General Statistics Office reported 70,000 (net of
closures/dissolutions) new enterprises registered nationwide.51 By any
measure, the transformation of the business incorporation process from a
petition to a registration system can only be seen as a success made
possible by the Enterprise Law.
Figure 1: Domestic Private Business Registration in Vietnam
(1991–2006)52

50. EDMUND J. MALESKY, VIETNAM PROVINCIAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX 1 (2005) (on file
with Seattle University Law Review).
51. See Social and Economic Situation in Eight Months of 2019, VIET. GEN. STAT. OFF. (Aug.
15, 2019), https://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=622&ItemID=19340 (last visited Jan. 22,
2020).
52. PERKINS & ANH, supra note 49, at 26. New business formations in the last few years have
been as follows:
2015
94,800
2016
110,100
2017
126,859
2018
131,300
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Later revisions to Vietnam’s legal infrastructure have deepened and
filled out many (though not all) of the gaps in the laws governing business
organizations and corporate governance. By now, the legal infrastructure
surrounding business organizations include a variety of structures for
small as well as large corporate forms.53 Vietnam has also opened two
relatively large public stock exchanges (Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi) to
attract local as well as foreign capital.54 Additionally, Vietnam has
developed formal legal structures governing the regulation of foreign
investment through laws, trade, and investment agreements.
Vietnam now has had more than two decades of experience with
various corporate forms.55 The prevailing corporate form for larger or
publicly traded firms is the Joint Stock Company (JSC).56 In most
governance-related respects, the JSC—at least formally—looks like its
U.S. publicly-traded counterparts. In fact, they share many of the same
general governance mechanisms. One might conclude that since formal
Vietnamese corporate governance structures closely resemble those of
U.S. corporations, Vietnamese firms will have, over the past two decades,
also adopted fiduciary cultures similar to those of U.S. firms; however,
this has not been the case. The development of a fiduciary culture has not
necessarily followed the adoption of formal governance structures.
B. Fiduciary Culture and Corporate Governance
While the enabling nature of the 1999 Enterprise Law has had an
almost immediate impact on the atmosphere surrounding business
incorporation, it did little to encourage the development of internal
corporate governance or a fiduciary culture amongst managers and
shareholders.57 Broadly defined, a fiduciary culture is one in which typical
Released Publications, VIET. GEN. STAT. OFF., https://www.gso.gov.vn/Default_en.aspx?tabid=515
(last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
53. See generally LUẬT DOANH NGHIỆP [LAW ON ENTERPRISES] [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 1
(Viet.) (covering limited liability companies, joint-stock companies, partnerships, private companies,
and enterprise groups).
54. Recent research by Cuong et al., confirms what appears obvious to the casual observer of
Vietnam’s stock market. Cuong et al. find that Vietnam’s stock markets are subject to “noise trader
risk,” the effect of uninformed traders to move stock prices. See Phan Khoa Cuong, Tran Thi Bich
Ngoc, Bui Thanh Cong & Vo Thi Quynh Chau, Noise Trader Risk: Evidence from Vietnam’s Stock
Markets, 128 HUE U. J. SCI. 5 (2019). Similarly, Vo and Phan find evidence of uninformed herd trading
behavior in Vietnamese stock markets. See Xuan Vinh Vo & Dang Bao Anh Phan, Further Evidence
on the Herd Behavior in Vietnam Stock Market, 13 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL FIN. 33 (2017).
55. These various forms include multiple member LLC, single-member LLC, partnership,
business cooperation contract, public–private partnership, and the joint stock company, among others.
56. See generally BAKER & MCKENZIE, LLP, FORMS OF DOING BUSINESS IN VIETNAM (2016),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/forms-of-doing-businessin-vietnam-2017.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/D2D4-GPNS].
57. See infra pp. 595–96.
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fiduciary norms of care and loyalty are respected and enforced by
shareholders. The development of fiduciary culture in Vietnam has been
long in the making.
The 2014 Enterprise Law addressed some of these issues for the first
time.58 Under Article 160 of the 2014 Enterprise Law, managers have
statutory obligations of both care and loyalty with regards to their
management of the company:
Art. 160. Responsibilities of managers of [the] company
1. Each member of the Board of Management, the director or general
director and other manager [of a company] has the following
responsibilities:
(a) To exercise his or her delegated powers and perform his or
her delegated obligations strictly in accordance with this Law, in
relevant laws, the charter of the company, and the resolutions of the
General Meeting of Shareholders;
(b) To exercise his or her delegated powers and perform his or
her delegated obligations honestly and prudently to their best ability
in order to assure the maximum legitimate interests of the company;
(c) To be loyal to the interests of the company and shareholders;
not to use information, know- how, business opportunities of the
company, [not to abuse] his or her position and powers and not to use
assets of the company for his or her own personal benefit or for the
benefit of other organizations or individuals . . . .59

To the extent corporate law seeks to mitigate agency problems and
foster the development of fiduciary culture, obligations of both care and
loyalty by managers are a cornerstone.60 However, the mere incantation of
obligations without a mechanism for self-enforcement of these obligations
does not accomplish a great deal.
The formal self-enforcing governance structures available in the
2014 Enterprise Law go well beyond even governance standards set by the

58. The more common approach to fiduciary duties is through application of the criminal laws.
For example, a manager of a state-owned enterprise can be charged with the crime of “waste” of
corporate assets in the event the enterprise suffers losses under his or her management. See, e.g.,
Former AVG Chairman Detained in Bribery Probe, VIỆT NAM NEWS (Apr. 13, 2019), https://vietnam
news.vn/politics-laws/518716/former-avg-chairman-detained-in-bribery-probe.html#uW1OjYWtM1
g7ydVo.97 [https://perma.cc/F39V-ZC6K] (alleging “violations in the management and use of public
investment capital causing serious consequences at MobiFone Telecommunications Corporation and
relevant agencies”).
59. LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 160 (Viet.).
60. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1996).
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Delaware corporate code.61 Vietnam’s 2014 Enterprise law builds on
earlier iterations of Vietnam’s enterprise law in that it is enabling and not
prohibitive in nature.62 The law also creates a framework for shareholders
to engage in the private ordering of affairs of the corporation, to monitor
the behavior of managers, and to intercede when they believe managers
may have exceeded their authority or otherwise harmed the corporation.63
To the extent the current enterprise law gives tools to shareholders to
permit them to engage in self-help, one could also characterize Vietnam’s
current enterprise law as self-enforcing in nature. Among other things, it
delegates power to the shareholders to do the following:
 Elect and remove directors;
 Adopt a corporate strategy;
 Approve related party transactions (similar to Delaware’s § 144);
 Approve financial statements;
 Decide on redemption of 10% or more of company’s stock; and
 Consider and decide breaches by the board.64
To facilitate private enforcement of the director’s obligations, the
2014 Enterprise Law delegates the authority to shareholders to bring
derivative actions against managers of the company who may have fallen
short.65 Shareholders have the right to seek books and records of the
company for the purpose of evaluating managers’ performance.66
Shareholders also have the power to replace underperforming directors at
the annual shareholder meeting.67 These governance mechanisms are selfhelp tools typically relied on by shareholders to develop a fiduciary culture
where shareholders, looking out for their own interests, can monitor
managers.
Just as the presence of enabling laws does not necessarily result in
the development of a fiduciary culture, neither does the presence of
statutory self-enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, there is a lack of evidence
that the legal duties of care and loyalty spelled out in the Enterprise Law
have translated into a corresponding fiduciary culture.
Any self-enforcement regime requires disclosure in order to assure
its efficacy. Notwithstanding requirements, corporate disclosure is in
relatively short supply. The Securities Law as well as the Enterprise Law
61. See LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] (Viet.).
62. See LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 13/1999/QH10] (1999) (Viet.).
63. See id.
64. LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 114, 135 (Viet.); Hikari Oguchi et al.,
Vietnam, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2013, at 286 (2013).
65. LAW ON ENTERPRISES [No. 68/2014/QH13] art. 161 (Viet.).
66. Id. at art. 162, 165.
67. Id. at art. 156.
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require that listed companies disclose certain material information about
the company, including information related to the company’s governing
documents, financials, and material events that occur on a corporate
website.68 Take, for example, Vinamilk, a listed Vietnamese joint stock
company and one of Vietnam’s largest and best regarded corporations.
Vinamilk discloses its governing documents, its current financial
information, and its press releases related to material events affecting the
company on its own website.69 The structure of disclosure requirements in
the Securities Law is consistent with that which would be required to
develop self-enforcing fiduciary norms. Compliance with the disclosure
requirements under the Securities Law, however, is not uniform. Many
listed firms do not post even the most basic corporate information required
under the law to their public websites.70 To the extent the law’s
requirement is intended to inform shareholders and facilitate selfenforcement via a distributed publishing requirement in lieu of a central
public filing system (e.g., SEC’s EDGAR), its distributed structure lacks
efficacy.71
Notwithstanding the self-enforcement mechanisms built into both
cornerstone laws governing the corporate sector in Vietnam, there is
minimal evidence that shareholders rely on them. Shareholders have the
power to bring lawsuits to enforce their legal rights against managers.
Though at times abused, this power is a vital tool in corporate governance
in the U.S. In the context of Vietnamese companies, there is little evidence
that shareholders bring suits to police against manager opportunism.
Litigation to police manager agency costs is permitted under the Enterprise
Law, but it is rarely taken up.72 A rare example of a shareholder bringing
such a suit involved the divorce between Mr. Dang Le Nguyen Vu and his
wife, Le Hoang Diep Thao. Mr. Vu is the founder of Trung Nguyen, a

68. LUẬT CHỨNG KHOÁN [LAW OF STOCK] [No. 70/2006/QH11] art. 100–01 (Viet.).
69. See Welcome to Vinamilk’s Investor Relations Shareholders’ Meeting, VINAMILK (Sept. 4,
2019), https://www.vinamilk.com.vn/en/shareholders-meeting [https://perma.cc/Y7K2-57U2].
70. Compliance generally includes a corporate charter, resumes of directors, financial
statements, and shareholder meeting information. See, e.g., VIETNAMOBILE, http://vietnamobile.
com.vn/ [https://perma.cc/2VLN-SKJ8]; VNG GROUP, https://www.vng.com.vn [https://perma.cc/HT
57-DVE3]; VIETNAM RAILWAYS, http://www.vr.com.vn/ [https://perma.cc/9VW4-D643].
71. See generally VINH NGUYEN, ANH TRAN & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, INSIDER TRADING
AND STOCK SPLITS (2012) (on file with Seattle University Law Review) (with respect to run of the
mill corporate governance issues, the weakness of self-enforcement is not necessarily made up for by
effective public enforcement of the enterprise law. From the opening of the stock exchange in Ho Chi
Minh City until 2011, there was only one prosecution for violation of Vietnam’s insider trading
regulations).
72. E-mail from Baker & McKenzie Partner to Author in Ho Chi Minh City (Oct. 5, 2018)
(confirming that shareholders rarely bring litigation) (on file with author).
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large, private coffee company.73 In addition to the joint assets owned with
Mr. Vu, Ms. Thao was a ten-percent shareholder of Trung Nguyen.74 She
filed a lawsuit against her husband’s decision to dismiss her from the
company, claiming it prevented her from participating in running and
managing the company as part of the divorce proceedings.75 Ultimately,
the court ordered Ms. Thao’s shares appraised for fair value.76
The fact that few Vietnamese shareholders access the courts is no
real surprise. The domestic courts have a long-standing reputation for
corruption and reports of payments to judges for favorable rulings are
commonplace.77 In such a situation, it is not at all unusual that shareholders
might view courts as anemic and unhelpful and thus not pursue a court
remedy to assert fiduciary or other corporate governance claims.
1. Corruption as a Fiduciary Claim
In the absence of actual fiduciary duty litigation brought by
shareholders, one can look for proxies for evidence of fiduciary culture.
Professor Sung Hui Kim has argued that corporate corruption is essentially
a subset of the fiduciary problem.78 In that sense, corporate corruption
including bribes and secret commissions, corporate opportunities,
renewals and reversions, misappropriation of confidential information,
and other conflicts of interest are all examples of fiduciary violations.79

73. See Ky Hoa, Vietnam’s Coffee Queen Checkmates King in One Court Case, VNEXPRESS
(Sept. 21, 2018), https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/companies/vietnam-s-coffee-queen-check
mates-king-in-one-court-case-3812946.html [https://perma.cc/85A4-ENVH].
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (it should be noted that appraisal is not statutorily available given the facts in this
particular case. Nevertheless, the court decided to proceed with an appraisal rather than a judicial
dissolution or other statutory remedy); see also Đặng Lê Nguyên Vũ và câu nói 'như xát muối' vào tim Lê
Hoàng Diệp Thảo, TIN MOI (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.tinmoi.vn/dang-le-nguyen-vu-va-cau-noi-nhuxat-muoi-vao-tim-le-hoang-diep-thao-011517224.html [https://perma.cc/7JUJ-9NK4].
77. See Conference Tackles Judicial Corruption, VIET. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), https://vietnam
news.vn/society/266075/conference-tackles-judicial-corruption.html#7HKZPaHDOyP18hIU.97
[https://perma.cc/QV8F-CNY4]. Nguyen Duc Chinh, Deputy Justice Minister, stated, “Corrupt
officials make up a big proportion of the judicial office and it is hard for the public to trust the judicial
system.” Id. Nguyen Van Hau, Deputy Chairman of the HCM City Lawyers Association, admitted
that “a lot of lawyers pay bribes [to get a favorable verdict] because judicial officials demand them.”
Id. See generally Transformation Index BTI Report: Vietnam Country Report, BERTELSMANN
STIFTUNG (2016), https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/vnm/ity/2016/itr
/aso/ [https://perma.cc/Y75L-P8AF] (discussing Vietnam’s corruption in the private sector).
78. See Sung Hui Kim, Fiduciary Law’s Anti-Corruption Norm, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
FIDUCIARY LAW 117 (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith eds., 2018).
79. Id. at 118.
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It is no secret that corruption in Vietnamese companies is endemic.80
For example, a 2018 study on corporate corruption sponsored by the
Vietnamese Communist Party found more than fifty-four percent of
11,000 firms that responded made informal payments.81 Seven percent of
enterprises responding to the same survey reported they had to spend over
ten percent of their revenue on informal costs.82 However, private
enforcement of conflicts of interest remains weak and other forms of
corporate corruption are also common. It has been noted that “[a]mong a
significant number of local [Vietnamese] companies, the perception of
bribery as a part of the Vietnamese ‘business culture’ and as ‘unavoidable’
has led to an acceptance of informal payments in daily business
transactions.”83
A recent government decision requires board members and managers
of publicly traded companies to disclose conflicts of interest and requires
recusal, as well as imposes duties on controlling shareholders.84
Nevertheless, compliance remains relatively low. For example, sixty-eight
percent of firms from the previous survey “have general written policies
and procedures to identify, monitor and manage conflicts of interest.”85
“However, only 45% [of survey respondents] have written rules or
procedures, whereby their officers and management personnel must
declare any conflicts of interest in transaction[s] with third parties.”86
Furthermore, “the number of firms having written rules or procedures on
staff to declare any outside [conflicts of] interests is even lower (23%).”87
A survey of forty-five of Vietnam’s largest companies regarding
corporate corruption revealed that more than half of the companies
surveyed (24/45) do not make any public disclosure of their anti80. See, e.g., Thuy Thu Nguyen & Mathijs A. van Dijk, Corruption, Growth, and Governance:
Private vs. State-Owned Firms in Vietnam, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 2935, 2936 (2012); Vietnam,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/country/VNM [https://perma.cc/DFS3-286R]
(ranking Vietnam’s corruption perception index as 117/180).
81. Vietnam’s Business Environment Continues to Improve, PCI Report Shows, NHÂN DÂN
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://en.nhandan.org.vn/business/economy/item/7397202-vietnam%E2%80%99sbusiness-environment-continues-to-improve-pci-report-shows.html [https://perma.cc/33YE-GT7M].
82. Id.
83. LIEN NGUYEN, CHRISTIAN LEVON & LINH NGUYEN, TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY, BUSINESS
INTEGRITY IN HIGH TECH PARKS IN VIETNAM: A SURVEY REPORT 3 (2018).
84. See NGHỊ ĐỊNH HƯỚNG DẪN VỀ QUẢN TRỊ DOANH NGHIỆP CỦA CÔNG TY ĐẠI CHÚNG [DECREE
GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES] [No. 71/2017/ND/CP] art. 25, 26,
35 (Viet.) (QĐ71 makes violations of the disclosure of conflicts and related party transactions civil
infractions); New Regulations to Prevent Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Governance, VIETNAM L.
& LEGAL F. MAG. (June 16, 2017), http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/new-regulations-to-preventconflicts-of-interest-in-corporate-governance-5896.html [https://perma.cc/2K29-BV5E].
85. NGUYEN, LEVON & NGUYEN, supra note 83, at 10.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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corruption programs, and almost no companies (3/45) disclose any
information to shareholders regarding policies prohibiting facilitation
payments.88
Absent evidence of shareholders actually availing themselves of the
governance tools provided by the Enterprise Law, one can only conclude
that the self-enforcing nature of the current corporate law has not led to
the development of fiduciary norms during the twenty years since the
Enterprise Law was first adopted.
C. Preference for Public Enforcement
In 2018, Vietnamese prosecutors charged executives of Mobifone, a
large mobile telephone company, over a botched acquisition.89 The former
director general of Mobifone, Cao Duy Hai, and deputy director general,
Pham Thi Phuong Anh, were charged by the state with “violating
regulations on managing and using public investment capital.”90 The
government alleged the officers caused Mobifone to overpay for AVG, the
company Mobifone was acquiring.91 In the context of U.S. corporate
governance, “corporate waste” is at most a civil claim by shareholders
against directors and officers and is rarely successful.92 However, such
charges are not uncommon in Vietnamese businesses where the state
maintains a shareholding position.93

88. LIEN NGUYEN, CHRISTIAN LEVON & LINH NGUYEN, TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY,
TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE REPORTING: ASSESSING THE 45 LARGEST COMPANIES 6–9 (2018)
[hereinafter NGUYEN, LEVON & NGUYEN, 45 LARGEST COMPANIES].
89. Agence France-Presse, Vietnam’s Top Telecom Bosses Face Arrest Over Loss-Making TV
Deal Amid Corruption Crackdown, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.scmp.
com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2173261/vietnams-top-telecom-bosses-face-arrest-over-lossmaking-tv [https://perma.cc/JA75-VFVE].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally Harwell Wells, The Life (and Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1239 (2017) (surveying waste doctrine).
93. See, e.g., Anti-Corruption Committee Looks to Ramp Up Efforts in Key Cases, NHÂN DÂN
(May 21, 2019), https://en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/domestic/item/7491802-anti-corruption-comm
ittee-looks-to-ramp-up-efforts-in-key-cases.html [https://perma.cc/CJ4H-V6KZ] (noting a series of
open corruption cases against the following businesses: Vietnam Social Security, Hai Thanh Co.,
MobiFone Telecommunications Corp., PetroVietnam Biofuels JSC, Phuong Nam (Southern) Bank,
and Saigon Beer-Alcohol-Beverage Corp. (Sabeco) among others); Kham Nguyen, Vietnam Court
Sentences to Death PetroVietnam Ex-Chairman in Mass Trial, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-security/vietnam-court-sentences-to-death-petrovietnamex-chairman-in-mass-trial-idUSKCN1C40KW [https://perma.cc/5GVP-LKE6]; Viet Tuan, Vietnam
to Put Corrupt Top Ex Officials in the Dock, VN EXPRESS (May 21, 2019),
https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-to-put-corrupt-top-ex-officials-in-the-dock-3927087.html
[https://perma.cc/K6WJ-8P9J] (noting a case in which mismanagement of public land and state assets
caused losses at Hai Thanh Company); Vietnam Fraud Trial: Death Penalty for Ex-Head of
OceanBank, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41439866 [https://
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The Mobifone prosecution is an example of an expression of a policy
preference in favor of public enforcement over a self-enforcing model of
corporate governance. In this public enforcement model, the state uses
wars and corruption as the hooks to justify state policing of violations of
the duties of care and loyalty. Where the targets of the public enforcement
are corporations with state investment, criminal sanctions for
mismanagement by corporate officers at least might be rationalized.
However, effective January 1, 2018, amendments to the Penal Code as
well as the Anti-Corruption Law now include private business corruption
as criminal offenses.94 The revised Anti-Corruption Law now criminalizes
conflicts of interest in private businesses, including banning managers
from signing contracts with businesses run by their relatives
(notwithstanding the existence of interested director and manager safe
harbor provisions in the Enterprise Law), among other restrictions on
conflict transactions and relationships.95
In addition to deployment of the Anti-Corruption Law to monitor
conflicts of interest in the business sector, in 2017 the Government Office
adopted new regulations related to corporate governance in publicly traded
companies.96 In addition to laying out additional governance requirements
for publicly traded companies, such as separation of CEO from the
Chairman position, reiterating the right of shareholders to have access to
books and records of the corporation, and a prohibition against tunneling,
among other things, the decree reinforced the public enforcement aspect
of corporate governance.97 Violations of new public company governance
are subject to inspection by the State Securities Commission and
administrative fines in the event of discovery of violations.98
Perhaps in response to the difficulty in relying on corporate
governance devices to instill a fiduciary culture, Vietnam has recently
perma.cc/S4UP-WQVV] (former general director of OceanBank Nguyen Xuan Son was convicted of
embezzlement, abuse of power, and economic mismanagement and sentenced to death).
94. LUẬT PHÒNG, CHỐNG THAM NHŨNG [ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW] [No. 36/2018/QH14] (Viet.);
BỘ LUẬT HÌNH SỰ [PENAL CODE] [No. 100/2015/QH13] (Viet.); see John Frangos & Thomas J.
Treutler, New Penal Code Brings New Risks to Businesses in Vietnam, BRINK (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.brinknews.com/new-penal-code-brings-new-risks-to-businesses-in-vietnam/ [https://per
ma.cc/89C8-EPY6]; see also Extending Anti-Corruption Fight to Private Sector Enables Fair
Business Environment, VIET. NEWS (Dec. 7, 2018), https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/481583/
extending-anti-corruption-fight-to-private-sector-enables-fair-business-environment.html
[https://
perma.cc/4S6H-NLJE].
95. Extending Anti-Corruption Fight to Private Sector Enables Fair Business Environment,
VIET. NEWS (Dec. 7, 2018), https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/481583/extending-anti-corruptionfight-to-private-sector-enables-fair-business-environment.html [https://perma.cc/4S6H-NLJE].
96. See NGHỊ ĐỊNH HƯỚNG DẪN VỀ QUẢN TRỊ DOANH NGHIỆP CỦA CÔNG TY ĐẠI CHÚNG [DECREE
GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES] [No. 71/2017/ND/CP] (Viet.).
97. See generally id.
98. See id. art. 34.
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taken this new, more aggressive tact. This shift to public enforcement
suggests that going forward one might not expect self-enforcing
mechanisms of the Enterprise Law to be the source of fiduciary norms.
Rather, the source of fiduciary norms, should they develop, may well be
found in public enforcement of anti-corruption statutes. Such a result
would be consistent with the view that the efficacy of rule of law projects
in Vietnam’s Đổi Mới, such as the investments made in rewriting the
corporate law, are mixed at best.99 It also reveals a policy preference for
public enforcement rather than self-enforcement, consistent with political
ambivalence that can surround the embrace the of market system in
countries that, like Vietnam, do not concurrently adopt political reforms.
IV. THE ROLE OF INFORMAL TRANSMISSION VECTORS
As is clear from Part III, the mere fact that the formal legal structure
of the corporate law is self-enforcing on paper is not sufficient for it to be
self-enforcing in real life. Moving from formal legal structures on paper
to formal legal structures in reality requires the development of a legal
culture that seeks to enforce these rights.100 Relying on external vectors to
promote the transmission of fiduciary culture may provide an alternative
to relying on domestic self or public enforcement. External vectors for the
transmission of fiduciary culture might include foreign direct investment,
trade agreements, and external dispute resolution mechanisms (including
private arbitration).101
A. Trading Relationships
Since the end of World War II, the rapid development of an
international trading order with the WTO at its center also gave impetus
to renewed attention to the issues of the legal and regulatory infrastructure
necessary for global trading to expand.102 Global trade is, of course, not a
new discovery. However, prior to its most recent incarnation, trade was
constrained in part by a lack of formal regulatory mechanisms to permit
99. See MARK SIDEL, LAW AND SOCIETY IN VIETNAM 199–222 (2008).
100. See Stijn Claessens & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A
Survey, 15 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 1, 24 (2013) (some evidence suggests voluntary corporate
governance mechanisms have more effect where a country’s governance system is weak. However, in
the context of weak corporate governance institutions, there is an upper limit on the effect of voluntary
governance mechanisms).
101. GILLESPIE, supra note 25, at 280 (Gillespie observes that demand for corporate governance
is variable and that certain sectors, like the foreign invested sector, are amongst the strongest advocates
for stronger governance and rule of law).
102. See generally Philip Abbott, Jeanet Bentzen & Finn Tarp, Trade and Development: Lessons
from Vietnam’s Past Trade Agreements, 37 WORLD DEV. 341 (2009) (addressing market
imperfections through institutional reform was central to bringing output and trade expansion).

600

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:579

scale, relying mostly on reputation and other informal commitment
mechanisms.103 The new global trading order began a process of
harmonizing the regulatory structures that govern trade and investment
across the globe. Businesses seeking to be a part of the modern global
trading system must comport with the system’s regulatory structure and,
to their benefit, may also avail themselves of that same structure. The new,
more liberalized trading regime has successfully led to a rapid growth in
volume of trade and interconnectedness of the global supply chain by
engendering more fluid trade relations.104
Unlike the U.S., Vietnam is a small, open economy. It relies on its
external relationships to provide its economy with much of the impetus it
requires for growth. Consequently, external relationships, including the
foreign invested sector and international trading relationships, may be
critically important in transmitting important messages about legal culture
that firms may, over time, adopt.
Dispute resolution systems play a central role in international trading
relationships. The Transpacific Partnership (TPP) for its part includes a
controversial Investor-State Dispute Resolution clause that permits
international investors to sue states for infringements under the trading
arrangement.105 In addition, bilateral agreements often include provisions
for alternate dispute resolution systems, including either domestic or
international commercial arbitration. Outsourcing dispute resolution
outside the home state (Vietnam) signals a lack of confidence in local
institutions that is often justifiable. However, the scope of such
arrangements remains focused on interfirm relationships or firm–
government relationships and does not typically extend further into the
internal affairs of domestic firms. Commercial arbitration is generally not
available for the resolution of internal corporate disputes.106 For the most
part, commercial arbitration is restricted to contractual disputes between
business entities. Consequently, any effect international vectors may have
on the development of internal governance norms and fiduciary culture
through the development of local courts and other self-enforcement
mechanisms is, at best, a bankshot.
103. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1
(1990); see Janet Tai Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 349 (1981).
104. See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 21–23 (2013) (since 1990, the value of global exports
has more than tripled).
105. See generally Luke Nottage, The Investment Chapter and ISDS in the TPP: Lessons from
Southeast Asia (ISEAS Economics, Working Paper No. 2017-2, 2017) (on file with Seattle University
Law Review).
106. Le Cong Dinh, Arbitration in Vietnam, 11 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 164, 168
(2000).
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B. Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment is another possible vector that an open
economy such as Vietnam may use to transfer fiduciary culture. To the
extent that foreign invested firms act as examples of fiduciary culture,
foreign direct investment may result in the long-term development of
fiduciary norms. For example, although corruption is common, foreign
invested firms in Vietnam generally do a better job of creating and
disclosing internal processes to combat corruption and conflict of interest.
In a recent study, more than half of Vietnam’s forty-five largest companies
disclosed that they utilized no internal processes to combat corruption or
conflict of interest.107 On the other hand, foreign invested companies
outperform Vietnamese private companies in transparency related to
combatting business corruption.108 Vietnamese private companies
outperform state-owned enterprises on the same score.109 Though they
score less than a hundred percent, large multinational subsidiaries score
higher than all other types of businesses with regard to disclosure of their
anti-corruption programs.110
As Professor Gillespie observes, foreign investors have been among
the strongest advocates for strengthened rule of law in Vietnam.111 Given
their advocacy for a strengthened rule of law and attention to internal
anti-corruption programs, one might expect foreign investors to provide
momentum for the development of fiduciary culture. However, there is
reason to suspect that these claims are limited, particularly those that
suggest external mechanisms, like trade agreements or foreign investment,
will have direct effects on internal governance of Vietnamese
corporations.112
Foreign investment in the earliest years was largely dominated by
foreign–domestic joint venture structures.113 The joint venture structure
provides a potentially excellent vehicle for transmission of cultural norms
necessary for the development of fiduciary culture.114 However, the
107. NGUYEN, LEVON & NGUYEN, 45 LARGEST COMPANIES, supra note 88, at 12–13.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. GILLESPIE, supra note 25, at 280.
112. See generally Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh, Does WTO Accession Help Domestic Reform? The
Political Economy of SOE Reform Backsliding in Vietnam, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 85 (2017) (arguing
that rather than induce domestic reform, trade agreements may be counterproductive from a reform
point of view).
113. Ha Thanh Nguyen & Klaus E. Meyer, Managing Partnerships with State-Owned Joint
Venture Companies: Experience from Vietnam, 15 BUS. STRAT. REV. 39, 40 (2004) (observing nearly
half of foreign investments were made via the joint venture mechanism in a 2001/2002 survey).
114. See generally Eric W.K. Tsang, Duc Tri Nguyen & M. Krishna Erramilli, Knowledge
Acquisition and Performance of International Joint Ventures in the Transition Economy of
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impetus for the development of the joint ownership structure was land
access, not business expertise. Foreign investors in need of land to build
factories or other facilities had to join with local ventures to access this
land. Vietnamese partners in such joint ventures were almost exclusively
state-owned enterprises and often had little subject matter expertise to
bring to the table.115 As a result, the joint venture structure was largely a
product of regulatory arbitrage rather than a desire to transfer knowledge
or corporate culture. Following the implementation of the U.S.–Vietnam
Trade Agreement in 2001 and other market opening moves, joint ventures
mostly gave way to wholly-owned foreign enterprises as foreign-invested
firms were granted greater access to land without engaging with local
enterprises.116 While wholly foreign-owned firms may still be vehicles for
transferring fiduciary culture, the process for doing so would be a longer
process than under joint-venture structures.
In recent years, especially since the development of Vietnam’s
capital market and the implementation of the TPP, foreign investors have
begun to more easily access the Vietnamese market via financial
investments rather than using more traditional direct investment paths.117
Implementation of the TPP permits foreign investors to control as much
as fifty percent of a domestic entity without needing to seek special
approval or license as a foreign investment.118 Financial investments in
publicly-traded Vietnamese companies provide an opportunity to jump
start the development of fiduciary culture, especially where foreign
financial investments are accompanied by board representation.
In some cases, however, entry via financial investments has not been
smooth. ThaiBev, a Thai beer producer, is an example of this challenge.
In December 2017, ThaiBev purchased 53.58% of SABECO, a

Vietnam, 12 J. INT’L MARKETING 82 (2004) (developing a theory of knowledge acquisition and
transfer through joint venture structures).
115. Prema-chandra Athukorala & Tran Quang Tien, Foreign Direct Investment in Industrial
Transition: The Experience of Vietnam, 17 J. ASIA PAC. ECON. 446, 448 (2012) (notwithstanding
liberalization of the formal investment structures, joint ventures with SOEs continued to remain the
prime mode of FDI entry permitted in investment approval into the 2000s).
116. There is evidence that foreign investors investing in domestic private enterprises via the
capital markets (stock exchanges) have a positive effect on stock prices. This leaves open the
possibility that foreign capital flows through the securities markets may have the ability to affect the
development of fiduciary culture and internal governance. See Xuan Vinh Vo, Do Foreign Investors
Improve Stock Price Informativeness in Emerging Equity Markets? Evidence from Vietnam, 42 RES.
INT’L BUS. & FIN. 986 (2017).
117. An Thai, The Effect of Foreign Ownership on Capital Structure in Vietnam, 8 REV.
INTEGRATIVE BUS. & ECON. RES. 20, 21 (2017) (showing increase in foreign ownership in the Ho Chi
Minh City Stock Exchange).
118. See Le Hong Hiep, The TPP’s Impact on Vietnam: A Preliminary Assessment, ISEAS
PERSPECTIVE, Nov. 4, 2015, at 1, 8.
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state-owned beer producer, as part of Vietnam’s privatization program.119
Consistent with the Enterprise Law, ThaiBev then sought to take control
of the seven person board.120 However, the incumbent directors refused to
seat ThaiBev’s representatives.121 Rather than take advantage of their
rights under the Enterprise Law to seek an order from a court enforcing
their rights as controlling shareholders of SABECO, ThaiBev sought the
intervention of the Office of the Prime Minister to order its directors be
seated.122 ThaiBev took effective control of the company in April 2018,
after the government (but importantly, not a court) ordered its directors be
seated.123
Although financial investments offer a vector to transmit fiduciary
culture, fiduciary culture remains very much a work in progress.
Nevertheless, Essa et al. report evidence that the presence of foreign
investors or significant state ownership discourages opportunistic
behavior by controlling shareholders.124 For example, when minority
investors arrive at the table with base expectations of fiduciary culture, the
presence of foreign investors can deter their opportunism and serve as a
vector for transmission of fiduciary culture over time. The presence of
state ownership, on the other hand, likely reflects the fact that the state
continues to carry a big stick and that the threat of public enforcement
through criminal prosecution is not without effect.125
1. Blockholding
Perhaps one obstacle to the development of fiduciary culture within
business organizations is that Vietnam’s largest corporations are
119. ThaiBev Files Complaint Over Saigon Beer Board, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/ThaiBev-files-complaint-against-Saigon-Beer-following
-48-acquisition [https://perma.cc/ECM8-U87K]; see also Khanh Vu, SABECO Adds Representatives
of Major Shareholder ThaiBev to Board, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2018) https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-sabeco-thai-beverage-board/sabeco-adds-representatives-of-major-shareholder-thai
bev-to-board-idUSKBN1HU11W [https://perma.cc/F9MX-JRA3]; ThaiBev Joins SABECO Board
After Govt Steps In, VIET. NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/426838/thaibevjoins-sabeco-board-after-govt-stepsin.html#hz5CYb0ckiOvbU41.97 [https://perma.cc/CLC3-ZA8S].
120. ThaiBev Files Complaint Over Saigon Beer Board, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/ThaiBev-files-complaint-against-Saigon-Beer-following
-48-acquisition [https://perma.cc/ECM8-U87K].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See generally SAMY ESSA, REZUAL KABIR & HUY TUAN NGUYEN, UNIV. OF TWENTE
(NETHERLANDS), DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT EARNINGS MANAGEMENT? EVIDENCE
FROM VIETNAM (2016).
125. Prosecutions for misuse of state assets remain common in Vietnam. See, e.g., Mai Nguyen,
Vietnam Arrests Two Ex-Ministers Suspected of Mismanaging Public Investment, REUTERS (Feb. 23,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-security/vietnam-arrests-two-ex-ministerssuspected-of-mismanaging-public-investment-idUSKCN1QC082 [https://perma.cc/D9CY-7V7Q].
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dominated by blockholding structures rather than by Berle–Means
corporations. The statutory framework for corporate governance in
Vietnam takes its root from the lessons of Berle and Means and relies
heavily on self-enforcement by shareholders. However, to the extent that
Vietnamese corporations are more susceptible to controller agency
problems than they are to manager agency problems, the corporate
governance tools available to stockholders may not be up to the task of
constraining controller opportunism.
Vietnam is still dominated by private companies, most of which are
family-owned businesses. In such companies, the focus of fiduciary
culture allows shareholders to use the tools of corporate law to mitigate
management agency costs. This focus seems inappropriate because in
family-owned firms, the separation of ownership and control are
attenuated.126 Indeed, Gillespie observes that corporate law in all its
aspects is at least a second order issue in family-controlled private
companies in Vietnam.127
If law is going to matter, then it will matter to Vietnamese public
companies, where manager agency costs will ostensibly be more
important. However, as it turns out, public companies in Vietnam are not
traditional Berle–Means corporations. Rather than seeing a separation of
ownership and control, insiders control large blocks of stock. Le and Le
found that the average blockholding size in their sample of publicly-traded
Vietnamese firms was forty percent in 2013.128 The State is the largest
blockholder in Vietnamese public companies, holding control blocks in
seventy-one percent of the companies with blockholders in 2013.129
During the period of 2009–2013, the average blockholding size remained
relatively constant.130 However, the composition of the blockholding has
been slightly shifting with private domestic shareholders increasing their
positions at the expense of state control as the government privatized its
positions in firms.131 Managers and foreign investors do not appear to be
benefitting from this shifting of control. The government’s policy of
privatizing state stock positions in publicly-traded positions is not creating

126. GILLESPIE, supra note 25, at 281 (arguing that there is less demand for corporate law in
family owned companies).
127. See id.
128. Trinh Vinh Le & Trang Huyen Le, Ownership and Identity of Largest Shareholders and
Dividend Policy: Evidence from Vietnam, 8 ORGS. & MKTS. EMERGING ECONS. 86, 94–95 (2017).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
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Berle–Means corporations but rather transferring control from the state to
private controllers.132
Identity of Blockholders (percentage) 133
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Manager

6%

4%

4%

4%

3%

State

78%

75%

73%

72%

71%

Local Private

14%

18%

19%

20%

22%

Foreign

3%

3%

4%

4%

4%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Corporate structures in Vietnam are characterized by a high degree
of concentrated control, similarly to those in many other developing
countries and the United States during the period before the Berle and
Means study.134 Whereas the typical Berle–Means corporation may be
subject to managerial agency costs, Shleifer and Vishny observed that
highly concentrated ownership is also subject to controller agency costs.135
Controllers have incentives and the means to siphon private benefits of
control at the expense of minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny also
argue that the economic entrenchment of elites can bias capital allocation,
slow capital market development, and obstruct outsiders from entering
markets.136 VinGroup, the largest private corporate business group in
Vietnam, is an excellent example of a controlled Vietnamese
corporation.137 VinGroup is controlled by Mr. Pham Nhat Vuong,
Vietnam’s first billionaire.138 The VinGroup corporate business
organization has adopted a familiar pyramid structure with control over a
132. This “oligarch effect” is not all that dissimilar to what happened in Eastern Europe after
their rapid transition to markets, but in Vietnam, this transition is happening more slowly, but with the
same basic result: more and more state assets are being transferred to the hands of private controlling
interests rather than being shared widely through the economy. Cf. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky,
The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2005) (observing the dominance
of oligarch controlled corporations in the Russian economy).
133. Le & Le, supra note 128, at 95.
134. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 26, at 64–65.
135. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 739
(1997).
136. Id.
137. Estimated net worth of $7.8 billion puts Mr. Vuong at #239 on the Forbes list. #239 Pham
Nhat Vuong, FORBES (Sept. 13. 2019), https://www.forbes.com/profile/pham-nhat-vuong/#5
03b2608382e [https://perma.cc/25EX-LC49]; see also John Reed, The Rise and Rise of a Vietnamese
Corporate Empire, FIN. TIMES (June 26, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/84323c32-9799-11e99573-ee5cbb98ed36 [https://perma.cc/C2ED-W5Q6].
138. #239 Pham Nhat Vuong, FORBES (Sept. 13. 2019), https://www.forbes.com/profile/phamnhat-vuong/#503b2608382e [https://perma.cc/25EX-LC49].

606

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:579

series of subsidiaries held at the holding company level.139 Pyramid
structures, like the one used by VinGroup, are common in developing
countries.140 Such structures make extracting private benefits of control
easier for controlling shareholders by permitting controllers to maintain
control over the group, while also reducing the equity committed to the
controlled group.141
Figure 2 VinGroup Corporate Structure: Evidence of Pyramiding142

Blockholding affords different challenges than those that appear
where manager agency costs are the focus. For example, the presence of
controlling shareholders and pyramid structures suggests that tunneling or
expropriation of private benefits by controlling shareholders may be a
governance problem in Vietnamese companies.143 In fact, Toan and Tran
provide evidence that suggests that controllers engage in tunneling and
expropriating private benefits by way of excess receivables in controlled

139. See Reed, supra note 137 (describing the corporate group as a Vietnamese chaebol).
140. La Porta et al., supra note 37, at 473; see also Lucian Aye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman &
George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity The Mechanisms and
Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights (NBER, Working Paper No. 6951, 1999).
In addition, the diversified conglomerate structure that such firms adopt is consistent with inefficient
deployment of capital. See Duc Nam Phung & Anil V. Mishra, Corporation Diversification and Firm
Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms, 55 AUSTL. ECON. PAPERS 386 (2016).
141. See supra note 140.
142. Vincom Retail, Corporate Presentation 9 (Sept. 2019) (unpublished presentation) (on file
with Seattle University Law Review).
143. Tunneling refers to the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder.
See Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 (2000).
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entities.144 The pernicious effect of pyramid structures that accompany
blockholding is well-known and is no doubt one reason why the
Vietnamese government adopted 71/2017 ND-CP, which placed such
transactions under greater scrutiny.145 Absent workable tools for minority
shareholders to constrain opportunism by controllers, blockholding works
against the development of fiduciary culture. However, Toan and Tran
find that tunneling activity is constrained when firms increase their
reliance on bank financing.146 As firms with blockholders increase their
reliance on outside bank financing, they reduce their tunneling activity.147
This suggests a role for banks, as third parties looking over the shoulders
of blockholders, to help improve fiduciary culture.148 Of course, reliance
on bank financing is no guarantee against poor corporate governance,
especially when bankers themselves are also open to corruption.149
CONCLUSION
The concept of the law and development movement and its
successor, the new rule of law movement, is that it began with a belief,
sometimes justified, that merely changing the formal legal and regulatory
structures would affect development of legal culture. Legal culture,
however, is embedded in a larger social context.150 Merely changing legal
rules will not necessarily result in changes to legal norms and legal culture.
The example of corporate governance in Vietnam is a case in point.
One might agree that proper corporate governance exists to minimize the
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership of capital from
control that is exemplified by the management of most modern businesses.
Efficient corporate governance structures are those, like the self144. See generally Toan Luu Duc Huynh & Tran Bao Kieu Cong, Bank Financing and
Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam, 7 ASIAN ECON. & FIN. REV. 1055 (2017).
145. NGHỊ ĐỊNH HƯỚNG DẪN VỀ QUẢN TRỊ DOANH NGHIỆP CỦA CÔNG TY ĐẠI CHÚNG [DECREE
GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES] [No. 71-2017-ND-CP] art. 24
(Viet.) (requiring prior approval of any transaction with a controller to be approved by both the
shareholders at a general meeting and by the board of directors).
146. Huynh & Cong, supra note 144, at 1172.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Mai Nguyen, Vietnam Prosecutes Bank Officials in Corruption Crackdown,
REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-security/vietnam-prosecutesbank-officials-in-corruption-crackdown-idUSKBN1DO0EB [https://perma.cc/HCF2-STEL]; Khanh
Vu, Vietnam Jails ‘Aluminum Vu’ at Center of Corruption Scandal, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-security-trials/vietnam-jails-tycoon-aluminium-vu-atcenter-of-corruption-scandal-idUSKCN1OJ118 [https://perma.cc/MD3X-FWPL]; Vietnam Banker
Gets $937 Million Fine, 30-Year Jail Term for Embezzlement, STRAITS TIMES (June 1, 2018),
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/vietnam-banker-gets-937-million-fine-30-year-jail-termfor-embezzlement (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
150. See Lawrence Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 29
(1969).

608

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:579

enforcement regimes described earlier in this Article, that minimize
incentives for managers to engage in self-dealing behavior while placing
incentives on outside shareholders to engage in oversight. However,
creation of self-enforcement mechanisms will not necessarily result in the
development of fiduciary culture, especially when the problems faced by
firms can be attributable in part to controller agency costs.
After Vietnam’s now more than thirty years of experience
developing its corporate governance, the results have been decidedly
mixed. On the one hand, by removing obstacles to incorporation through
shifting to a registration system, Vietnam has enjoyed an explosion in the
growth of private enterprise since 2000. On the other hand, this rapid
growth in the establishment of private businesses has not translated into
the development of fiduciary culture. Rather than seeing a self-enforcing
fiduciary culture, Vietnam has circled back to public enforcement of
fiduciary principles. Under the guise of anti-corruption and anti-waste
efforts, authorities are policing violations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,
violations that under self-enforcing structures like the current Enterprise
Law should be policed by shareholders. This approach signals a policy
preference to develop fiduciary culture enforced through public, rather
than private, mechanisms—this notwithstanding the content of selfenforcing corporate law that the country adopted in recent years. Despite
this policy preference, fiduciary culture may still develop endogenously
through the influence of foreign financial investors with board
representation as well as through the oversight of banks providing
financing to the businesses.
It should be clear, given the past three decades experience of
economic reform and transition in Vietnam, that the development of
fiduciary culture and corporate governance is generally an organic process
that responds to conditions specific to the cultural background against
which they play out over time rather than to changes in the statute. This
distinction is a lesson from the law and development movement that is
learned once and again. As markets and corporate ownership structures
develop and mature, there may well be internal pressures to take advantage
of the tools offered by the corporate law and to develop robust governance
structures. Perhaps those structures will resemble the self-enforcing
fiduciary culture readily identifiable by American legal scholars, or
perhaps not.

